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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 2014, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc.,1 holding that EnergySolutions had not 
violated Vander Boegh’s rights as a whistleblower. Although the Sixth Circuit 
correctly decided Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc. under current law, 
the decision has far reaching policy implications that should spur the 
legislature into amending the existing protections for whistleblowers. In its 
decision, the court focused on the definition of “employee” as used in 
whistleblower protection statutes. By refuting the argument that “applicants” 
are “employees” for standing purposes, the Sixth Circuit ignored and 
reinforced the largest gap in whistleblower protection: the practice of 
blacklisting applicants with whistleblower history during the interview 
process. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Gary Vander Boegh was employed by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) to work at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP).2 The PGDP 
contract to manage the plant was originally awarded to Bechtel Jacobs 
Company, LLC (BJC). Vander Boegh worked for one of BJC’s subcontractors 
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(WESKM) as a landfill manager. Both parties agree that while Vander Boegh 
worked for this subcontractor, he participated in a range of protected activities, 
including reporting environmental violations, both through internal reporting 
and external reporting to the DOE.3 In December 2001 and January 2002, 
Vander Boegh filed complaints with the DOE’s Employee Concern Program 
(ECP).4 After filing complaints, he was the victim of harassment at BJC. In 
July 2003, a DOE officer found for Vander Boegh in a retaliation claim and 
prohibited BJC from interfering with Vander Boegh’s employment for one 
year.5 
In 2005, the DOE awarded the PGDP contract to Paducah Remediation 
Services, LLC (PRS). PRS subcontracted EnergySolutions to provide waste 
management services. In January 2006, the transition from WESKEM to 
EnergySolutions began. On February 21, 2006, Vander Boegh filed another 
ECP complaint regarding a former coworker, Kevin Barber.6 Barber was an 
actor in the retaliation Vander Boegh faced at BJC. Barber became a member 
of the transition team and an influence on hiring decisions, which caused 
Vander Boegh concern given their history.7 In late February of that year, a 
landfill manager position that Vander Boegh was considered for was offered to 
another candidate. John Kelly, the leader of the transition team officially 
making hiring decisions, stated that he was both unaware that Vander Boegh 
was told he was to be considered for the position and of his past 
whistleblowing experience.8 
On February 24, 2006, Vander Boegh filed his fourth ECP complaint with 
the DOE alleging conspiracy between BJC, WESKEM, and EnergySolutions 
to terminate his employment because of his whistleblowing activity.9 While 
the complaint was pending, another landfill position opened at 
EnergySolutions on March 14, 2006.10 Vander Boegh applied to be the new 
landfill manager and interviewed for the position. However, he was told after 
his interview that the position was no longer available. After the PGDP 
contract was fully transferred on April 23, 2006, Vander Boegh’s employment 
was terminated and the new landfill manager assumed his duties. Believing 
this to be in retaliation for his previous whistleblowing actions, Vander Boegh 
filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Department of Labor. 
Vander Boegh removed to federal court and brought suit against 
EnergySolutions, BJC, and PRS (the defendants). He alleged violations of six 
federal employee protection statutes.11 Two relevant laws to the Sixth 
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Circuit’s decision are the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA)12 and the False 
Claims Act (FCA).13 The Western District of Kentucky granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on May 3, 2012.14 Vander Boegh 
appealed, and on August 14, 2013, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed 
in part, and remanded, holding that there were factual issues that precluded the 
summary judgment and that there was no evidence that there was improper 
influence over hiring decisions.15 On December 17, 2013, the Western District 
of Kentucky granted EnergySolutions’ (the only named defendant’s) motion 
for summary judgment.16 Vander Boegh again appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 
On November 18, 2014, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. 
On the second appeal, Vander Boegh argued that he met the qualifications 
of an employee under the ERA and FCA when he applied for the new landfill 
manager position and that, as such, deserved protection against retaliation for 
whistleblowing activity.17 He reasoned that the term “employee” was 
ambiguous and that the court had the ability to extend protection to 
applicants.18 EnergySolutions argued that Vander Boegh was not an 
“employee” as defined by the statutes. Furthermore, the company maintained 
that there was not improper influence on hiring decisions. 
The Sixth Circuit ruled that Vander Boegh, as an applicant to the landfill 
manager position, was not an “employee” as defined by the statutes.19 
Therefore, he lacked standing to sue under those federal statutes and would not 
receive protection.20 Under common law, legislative interpretation, and 
dictionary definitions, Vander Boegh did not meet any of the qualifications of 
an “employee” with regards to EnergySolutions. The court considered 
congressional intent when interpreting the scope of the definition of 
“employee.” There was no indication Congress meant to expand the definition 
to include applicants. Furthermore, because the common law meaning of 
“employee” does not include applicants, the court found that applicants were 
not included in the definition of an employee receiving standing.21 As an 
applicant, Vander Boegh did not meet the threshold requirement of being an 
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employee with standing to sue under the ERA and FCA.22 He was not subject 
to EnergySolutions’ control at the time of his application and interview 
process and never officially worked for the company. Given the common law 
interpretation of the word “employee” and the operable statutes, the Sixth 
Circuit was not wrong in its decision. However, the correct decision highlights 
a massive hole in whistleblower protections. 
III. THE GAP IN PROTECTION 
The current whistleblower protection and interpretation of “employee” and 
standing does not provide adequate protection to whistleblowers against 
retaliation, as evidenced by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Vander Boegh v. 
EnergySolutions, Inc. Although there is current whistleblower protection, 
applicants with a prior history of whistleblowing are not sufficiently protected 
from adverse employment retaliation or harassment. 
Current whistleblower protection focuses on employees while they are still 
employed by the company or employers who committed the wrong. Society 
expects whistleblowers to receive protection after reporting illegal or unethical 
activity.23 The societal benefit of stopping illegal or unethical activity 
outweighs the cost of protecting these employees. For the most part, 
whistleblowers do receive an adequate amount of official protection, even if it 
is not always effective. Employers are forbidden from retaliating against 
whistleblowers, either with harassment or job retaliation.24 The protection is 
necessary. Many employees list job retaliation as a main fear preventing them 
from reporting illegal or unethical activity.25 They have come to expect a 
certain amount of protection in the case that they report illegal activity.26 The 
protection currently provided to whistleblowers is effective when the 
whistleblower experiences retaliation as an employee of the organization 
subject to whistleblower’s report. 
Despite the focus and public support, protective whistleblower legislative 
schemes have their shortcomings. The official protection extended to 
whistleblowers falls drastically short of covering the real impact of reporting 
an employer for illegal or unethical actions. The gap exposed by the Sixth 
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Circuit is the limbo period between leaving a previous employer and seeking 
new work. It is unrealistic to expect many whistleblowers to comfortably 
remain with their employers for long periods of time after blowing the whistle 
on them. Although a workplace may have protections for whistleblowers, 
subtle harassment and resentment directed at a whistleblower—adversities that 
might not rise to the level of triggering protection—would likely drive some 
whistleblowers to seek new employment. After leaving their job, those 
employees must seek work suitable to their resumes. Inevitably, those 
positions will almost always be in the same field as their previous 
employment. At this point, a new fear enters a whistleblower’s mind: 
blacklisting. 
Blacklisting, or blackballing, is an outside form of retaliation in which the 
whistleblower’s previous employer will alert the industry to the 
whistleblower’s actions, preventing him or her from obtaining comparable 
employment.27 Employees list blackballing through loss of promotions or 
career changes as a real fear when deciding whether or not to report illegal 
activity.28 Blacklisting has become so common that it is almost an expected 
result of whistleblowing.29  
While there are some broad protections against blacklisting in the work 
place, the Sixth Circuit’s decision circumvents those protections. For example, 
under Title VII, retaliation against employees or job applicants that have 
complained about discrimination at previous employment is illegal.30 
Individuals may also file complaints with the U.S. Department of Labor in the 
case of job retaliation.31 But the Sixth Circuit’s decision separates 
discrimination complaints and whistleblowing into two separate actions, 
weakening Title VII’s influence. 
Furthermore, even with some protection, it is difficult for whistleblowers 
to successfully bring blacklisting claims. Whistleblowers are protected from 
unfavorable work retaliation, which can include blacklisting. However, there 
needs to be concrete proof that the former employer’s actions were the exact 
reason the whistleblower did not receive consideration for a different position 
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in the same industry.32 In one key blacklisting decision, the whistleblower was 
only successful because there was an employment verification form that stated 
he did not meet his previous company’s standards, while the real cause of his 
job departure was whistleblowing.33 In Vander Boegh’s case, there was no 
such form that could be pointed to as directly influencing the hiring decision. 
Beyond evidence of blacklisting, the greatest challenge Vander Boegh 
faced in his claim was proving his standing as an employee. The ERA and 
FCA only protect employees. This distinction is the crux of this case and the 
foundation for the court’s refusal to extend protection to Vander Boegh as an 
applicant.34 By focusing on Vander Boegh’s status at the time of the alleged 
employment retaliation, the court decided that whistleblower protection 
currently provided, specifically under the ERA and FCA, does not extend to 
protect whistleblowers as applicants after they leave their previous positions 
where they reported illegal or unethical activity.  
The court’s ruling exposes a major gap in whistleblower protection. The 
lack of protection applicants are given is a serious problem because this time 
gap is a situation that all whistleblowers will inevitably enter when they leave 
their previous employment. Although they are protected as employees of their 
previous employers, there is no protection once they leave and try to reenter 
the workforce. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A solution to this problem, however, will not come from the courts. The 
judiciary lacks the power to rewrite the definition of “employee” currently 
purported by the legislature. Instead, Congress must act. 
The legislature needs to amend whistleblowing protection to guard against 
the very real threat of blacklisting in the workforce felt by applicants through 
an amendment or the creation of new legislation. In the absence of legislative 
action extending whistleblower protection beyond its current scope, the 
incentive to report illegal or unethical activity is heavily outweighed by the 
threat of job retaliation or blacklisting. Societal interests in reporting illegal or 
unethical activity, however, far outweigh any complications that would result 
from expanding the definition of “employee” or creating new legislation that 
may be presently hindering Congress from taking action. In sum, this problem 
must be addressed and the protection for applicants with a history of 
whistleblowing should be enacted.  
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc. 
exposed a large gap in whistleblower protection that the legislature should 
address by expanding the definition of “employee” to include applicants or by 
crafting a separate set of regulations for applicants with a history of 
whistleblowing. 
